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IN --rHE SUPREME COURT
OF

r-l~HE

STATE OF UTAH
ST:\ TE

()f

l ~·rAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No. 10076

-vsc:H.\RLES ORVEL COLSTON,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
ST£\TE~lENT

OF NATURE OF CASE

The appellant, Charles Orvel Colston, has appealed
from a conviction for the crime of operating a vehicle on a
public high\\·ay in the State of Utah with a gross laden
\\·eight more than for \vhich the vehicle was registered, in
violation of-t 1-1-128, Utah Code Annotated 1953.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The appellant \\·as charged by complaint in the City
Court of Price, l~ tah, "·ith operating a vehicle which
\veighed in excess of the \veight for which it \\·as registered.
The appellant \\·as convicted and thereafter appealed his
conviction to the District Court in and for Carbon County,
State of lrtah. The trial \\·as held thereon on the 6th day
of December, 1963, before the Honorable Henry Ruggeri,
Judge. sitting ,,·ithout jury. The appellant was convicted
of the crime charged and appealed the conviction to the
Supreme Court.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent submits that the conviction should be
affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the 2nd day of February, 1963, the appellant,
Charles Colston, pulled a 1957 pickup truck, towing a 30foot house trailer, into the Peerless Checking Station, Price
Canyon, Carbon County, Utah (R-8). The vehicle was
weighed by the Highway Patrol ( R-8), and found to weigh
15,400 pounds. This was the weight of the combination
pickup truck and house trailer. A stencil on the pickup
truck indica ted that the registration of the vehicle was for
only 12,000 pounds (R-8, 13). Upon the combination
vehicle being weighed, Officer Bill Himes of the Utah
Highway Patrol had a discussion with the appellant,
wherein he told the appellant that the unit was registered
for 12,000 pounds and that it weighed 15,400 pounds. The
appellant made no protest that the unit was not registered
for 12,000 pounds, but only indicated that he had never
been stopped before. Officer Himes thereafter cited the
appellant for operating a vehicle over the registered gross
weight.
The appellant presented no evidence, but counsel for
the appellant in the District Court made an opening statement by way of offer of proof in which it was indicated that
the appellant had registered the vehicle for a 12,000-pound
gross laden \veigh t.
At the time of trial in the District Court, the complaint
charged the appellant with violation of 41-1-134, U.C.A.
1953. Thereafter, upon motion of the District Attorney,
the numerical charge \\·as changed to 41-1-127, U.C.A.
1953. The substance of the complaint, however, clearly
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charged the defendant with operating a vehicle which was
registered for 12,000 pounds when the vehicle weighed
15;~00 pounds. Thus, the substance of the charge was for
operating a vehicle over the weight for which it was registered, \vhich is contrary to the provisions of 41-1-128,

U.C.A. 1953.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE APPELLANT WAS CONVICTED OF THE OFFENSE
CHARGED SINCE THE NUMERICAL DESIGNATION OF
THE OFFENSE TO A CORRESPONDING SECTION OF THE
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED WAS MERE SURPLUSAGE AND
A DEFECT NOT GOING TO THE SUBSTANCE OF THE
CRIME CHARGED.

The appellant contends that he was convicted of a crime
other than the one charged. The complaint with which the
appellant was charged stated that:
"***on or about the 2nd day of February, A.D. 1963, at and
within the County of Carbon, State of Utah, did commit the crime
of \riolating Section 41-1-127, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
follows:
That the said defendant, at the time and place aforesaid,
operated a vehicle upon a public highway, to wit: U.S. 50 &
6, at Peerless, Carbon County, State of Utah, which said vehicle was registered in that State of Utah for 12,000 pounds,
and \vhich said vehicle at said time and place, weighed 15,400
pounds gross weight.''

The substance of that complaint remained the same
when the case was heard on appeal in the District Court in
and for Carbon County. The District Attorney made a
motion to amend the complaint at the outset to change the
numerical charge from 41-1-134, U.C.A. 1953, to 41-1127, U.C.A. 1953 (R-3). The court granted the motion
over the objection of the appellant. The substance of the
charge, however, remained the same, in that the detail of
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the crime with which the appellant was accused was the
operation of a vehicle registered for 12,000 pounds' weight,
which in fact weighed 15,400 pounds. Consequently, there
was no change in the nature of the crime charged nor did
counsel for the appellant appear to be in any way prejudiced by the change, since he strongly and vociferously
argued the constitutionality of the offense with which the
appellant was charged and clearly was not misled as to the
nature of the charge pending against the accused (R-14,
43) . The substance of the crime charged alleges a violation of 41-1-128, U.C.A. 1953. It is submitted that the
appellant has no basis for complaint or for reversal. 7711-1, U.C.A. 1953, provides as to what a complaint must
contain:
"The complaint must state:
" ( 1 ) The name of the person accused, if known; or if not
known and it is so stated, he may be designated by any other name.
"(2) The county in which the offense was committed.
" ( 3) The general name of the crime or public offense.
" ( 4) The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
crime or public offense named.
" ( 5) The person against whom or against whose property the
offense was committed, if known.
"(6) If the offense is against the property of any person, a general description of such property.
"However, in cases of public offenses triable upon information,
indictment or accusation, the complaint, the right to a bill of particulars, and all proceedings and matters in relation thereto, shall
conform to and be governed by the provisions of the new chapters
21 and 23 of Title 77, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by
chapter 118, La\\·s of Utah, 1935.
"The complaint must be subscribed and sworn to by the complainant."

There is no requirement, as can be seen from the above
provision, that the complaint specify the numerical sec-
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tion of the Code with which an accused is charged to have
violated. By merely setting forth a section of the Code, the
complaint added to the substance of the offense charged an
item of surplusage. 77-21-42, U.C.A. 1953, provides:
u Any allegation unnecessary under the existing law or under the
provisions of this chapter, may, if contained in an information,
indictment or bill of particulars, be disregarded, as surplusage."

This section, when read in conjunction with 77-21·l3 ( 1), \\'hich provides:
"No information or indictment that charges an offense in accordance with the provisions of section 77-21-8 shall be invalid or
insufficient because of any defect or imperfection in, or omission
of, any mattt·r of form only, or because of any miswriting, misspelling or improper English, or because of the use of a sign, symbol,
figure or abbreviation, or because of any similar defect, imperfection or omission. The court may at any time cause the information, indictment or bill of particulars to be amended in respect to
any such defect, imperfection or omission."

makes it obvious that mere defects in form are not a basis
for complaint. Especially is that so where there has been
a mere error in a particular symbol or figure which is contained 'vithin the complaint which does not change the
nature of the substantive offense charged.
In Whartons' Criminal Law and Procedure, Sec. 1770,
it is stated:
"* * * Moreover, it is the almost universal rule that when the
facts, acts, and circumstances are set forth in the body of an indictment or information with sufficient certainty to constitute an offense and to apprise the defendant of the nature of the charge
against him, a misnomer or inaccurate designation of a crime in
the caption or other part of the indictment or information will not
vitiate it; in such case, the statement of facts controls the erroneous
designation of the offense, and the defendant stands charged with
~e offense charged in the statement of fact. In many jurisdictions
lt is held that such erroneous designation of the offense may be disregarded as surplusage.
"Indictments have been held sufficient, notwithstanding a misnomer or inaccurate designation of the crime alleged, in view of
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statutes providing in effect that no indictment shall be deemed
insufficient for any merely formal defect not prejudicing any substantial right of the defendant, although an indictment which fails
to name any offense in the charging part thereof is insufficient to
sustain a conviction."

In State v. Schnell, 107 Mont. 579, 88 P.2d 19 ( 1939),
a case similar to the instant one was considered by the
Montana Supreme Court. The accused was charged with
the crime of operating a vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The appellant contended that he was
charged with a crime different than that for which he was
convicted. The complaint with which the defendant was
charged had given an erroneous name in that it named the
offense covered by Sec. 17 41.7, Revised Code of Montana,
but the facts and circumstances setting out the crime in the
complaint alleged an offense in violation of Sec. 1746.1,
Revised Code of Montana. In rejecting the contention that
the complaint was defective, the Montana Supreme Court
stated:
"Here the name given to the offense in the complaint may be
omitted as surplusage and the information is still sufficient under
section 17 46.1, because it still characterizes the offense as a misden1eanor and then proceeds to state how, specifically where and
in what manner it was committed. The erroneous name of the
offense will be treated as surplusage, since without it the complaint is still sufficient to charge the offense under section 1746.1.

31 C.J. 747."

In State v. Scow, 101 Utah 564, 125 P.2d 954 ( 1942),
this court was concerned with a similar situation to that
now before the court. The defendant Scow was charged by
information \vith the crime of pandering, \vhen in fact the
substantive allegations in the information set forth the
crime of transportation for the purposes of prostitution.
The trial court had granted a motion to quash the informa-
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tion. In reversing the trial court and holding the information to be proper, the court stated:
"Though it were conceded that the crime of 'pandering' does
not encon1pass under our statutes, the act of 'transporting a female
for the purposes of prostitution,' nevertheless it was error, in the
instant case, to quash the information.
~The ahnost universal rule at common law is that a misnonler or inaccurate designation of a crime in the caption or
other part of the complaint, indictment, or information will
not vitiate it where there is a sufficient (sic) detailing of the
facts constituting the offense in the body of the instrument so
that the defendant is fully apprised of the nature of the charge
against him. In such case the statement of facts controls the
erroneous designation of the offense, and the defendant stands
charged with the offense charged in the statement of facts.'
121 A.L.R. 1088, 1089.
Cases cited from many jurisdictions support the text. Especially
should this rule apply under Sections 105-21-41 and 105-21-42,
Laws of Utah 1935, c. 118, providing that repugnant allegations
shall not invalidate an information and that unnecessary allegations tnay be treated as surplusage. Under a similar statute of
Iowa, where an indictment named the offense of which the defendant was charged as manslaughter, but the facts set out in the
body of the indictment showed a murder, it was held that the
court could reject the word 'manslaughter' as surplusage and try
the defendant for the crime of murder. State v. Davis, 41 Iowa
311; State v. Sha,v, 35 Iowa 575 .
.. In the instant case the defendant could not be misled by designating the crime as 'pandering.' What he is alleged to have done
is stated. No act under Section 103-51-8 could, under such charge,
be proved against him. Two crimes are not charged. The word
'pandering' is used in the information in naming the offensenot in the charging part of the information. True, under Section
105-21-6 and 105-21-8, Laws of Utah 1935, c. 118, a crime may
be charged by using the name given the offense by the common
law or by statute. But ,,·here, as here, the acts alleged to have been
committed clearly charge a crime, the incorrect designation of
such crime - if it be incorrect - should be disregarded."

In State v. Burke:~ 102 Utah 249, 129 P.2d 560 ( 1942),
the defendant "·as charged with the crime of gambling
'"hen in fact the crime alleged in the information was one
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of gaming. In holding that the misnomer of the offense
did not affect the substance of the charge, the court stated:
"An erroneous designation of the offense does not invalidate an
information if by other proper allegations, the offense charged is
made clear, and repugnant allegations shall not invalidate an information. Unnecessary allegations may be treated as surplusage.
Laws of lhah 1935, Chapter 118, Section 105-21-42; State v.
Scow, Utah, 125 P.2d 954.
"The objections to the information are not well taken. State v.
Hill, 100 Utah 456, 116 P.2d 392; State v. Anderson, 100 Utah
468, 116 P.2d 398; State v. Avery, Utah, 125 P.2d 803."

Numerous cases have considered situations where there
have been misnomers in the caption of complaints and information, and have found that they are not matters which
affect the substance of the charge and consequently do not
entitle an appellant to relief. Anno. 121 A.L.R. 1088. The
Court of Military Appeals in several cases has ruled that
where the charge sets out a violation of a specifically named
section of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, but the
specification which is the factual allegation charging the
crime, sets out an offense different than that named in the
charge, an accused cannot complain if the substance of the
offense set out in the specification states a crime. Thus, in
United States v. Olson, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 460, 22 C.M.R. 250,
where an improper allegation under the Articles of War
was charged under the Uniform Code of Military Justice,
the court ruled that the misnomer of the offense did not
preclude a valid conviction \vhere the specification clearly
charged an offense. See also United States v. Deller, 3
U.S.C.M.A. 409, 12 C.M.R. 165; United States v. Long,
2 U.S.C.M.A. 60, 6 C.M.R. 60; United States v. Blevens,
5 U.S.C.M.A. 480, 18 C.M.R. 104. Obviously, therefore, it
is reasonably well settled in this jurisdiction and other jurisdictions that a mere mistake of form in stating the sub-
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stance of the particulars alleged in the complaint will not
entitle the appellant to relief. Consequently, not only is
appellant without a claim of simple error upon which to
predicate reversal, he has absolutely no basis for constitutional con1plaint.
POINT II.
TI-lE TRIAL COURT DID NOT CONVICT THE DEFENDANT
IN THE ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE PROVING HIS GUlL T.

The appellant has taken the position that the trial court
erred in finding him guilty, claiming that there was no
evidence of his guilt which would justify the trial court in
making such a finding, and consequently such action denied
him due process of law. The appellant relies upon three
decisions of the United States Supreme Court (among
others) for his contention. Primarily the appellant relies
upon Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 ( 1960). In that
case the United States Supreme Court reversed a decision
of the Police Court of Louisville, Kentucky, finding the appellant guilty of loitering and disorderly conduct. The only
evidence of the petitioner's having committed the offense
charged \\·as that the petitioner, in a cafe, was shuffling his
feet on the dance floor, at which time officers arrested him
and charged him with the crime from which he appealed.
The evidence on behalf of the petitioner showed that he
had been in the cafe waiting for a bus to his home, had
money~ and \\·as usually regularly employed. The manager
of the cafe "·here the accused was alleged to have engaged
in disorderly conduct indicated that the accused had merely
been standing in the middle of the dance floor patting his
foot. Based upon this, the United States Supreme Court
said that there \vas absolutely no evidence of the accused
having ,·iolated the ordinances charged nor having committed any other crime. The court stated:
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"Thus we find no evidence whatever in the record to support
these convictions. Just as 'Conviction upon a charge not made
would be sheer denial of due process,' so is it a violation of due
process to convict and punish a man without evidence of his guilt."

The second case of concern to the appellant's claim is
Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 ( 1961). There the
defendants were convicted of the crime of disturbing the
peace. The only evidence of the accused's guilt in that case
was that they were sitting peaceably in a restaurant reserved for white persons. There was no evidence of any
disturbing conduct by the accused. The United States
Supreme Court, therefore, determined that in the absence
of any evidence the convictions must be reversed. A similar result occurred in Taylor v. Louisiana, 370 U.S. 154
( 1962). It is admitted that if an individual is convicted in
the absence of any evidence indicating his guilt, such an
individual has been denied due process of law both under
the Federal Constitution and the Constitution of the State
of Utah. State v. Gordon, 28 Utah 15, 76 Pac. 882 ( 1904).
However, the present case is not one where there is a complete absence of evidence. Quite to the contrary, there is a
clear showing of the appellant's guilt. He drove a pickup
truck and trailer in Carbon County into the weighing station and there it was found to weigh 15,400 pounds. The
appellant contends there is no evidence to show that the
vehicle was registered for any less amount. However, the
evidence in fact shows two bases for a finding of the appellant's registration. First, the figure 12,000 was stenciled on
the side of the vehicle, which figure the Highway Patrol
officer testified, without objection, indicated that the appellant's vehicle was registered for 12,000 pounds gross laden
weight. In addition, when the Highway Patrol officer cited
the appellant, he stated in the appellant's presence that the
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appellant's vehicle \vas registered for only 12,000 pounds.
'Inc appellant made no response in protest to the assertion
that his ve.hicle \\·as registered for only 12,000 pounds. Consequently, there is a circumstance which constitutes an
admission by the appellant as to the registration of his
vehicles. Therefore, there is not the complete absence of
evidence \vhich the appellant contends denied him due
process of law. This case is substantially different than
the case of Thompson v. Louisville, supra. Nor does that
case go as far as appellant would contend. Thus, in Anno.
80 A.L.R.2d 1362, 1375 discussing the problem of a conviction of a criminal offense without evidence as being a denial
of due process of law, the Annotation states with reference
to the effect of Thompson v. Louisville :
Hln holding in Thompson v Louisville ( 1960) 362 US 199,
4 L ed 2d 654, 80 S Ct 624, 80 ALR2d 1, that the due process
guaranty of the Fourteenth Amendment required reversal of a
state court conviction of crime where the prosecution introduced
no eYidence, the United States Supreme Court stated for the first
time a rule binding state convictions by constitutional limitations
respecting quantum of evidence. If Thompson is to be regarded
as indicating the Supreme Court's acceptance of the role of re,·iewer of sufficiency of the evidence whenever it is asked to overtum on due process grounds a state conviction, then, manifestly,
the decision is of far-reaching importance, throwing grave doubt
upon the continued authoritative effect of existing law as to the
scope of Supreme Court review.
"But there is sound reason to believe that Thompson is not to be
so regarded, but on the contrary is to be viewed as reaching only
the very rare conviction which, like the conviction involved in
Thompson, is classifiable as a 'no evidence' case. It is submitted
that no change in scope of review is involved in Supreme Court
examination of the record in a criminal case to determine whether
there was any evidence to support the conviction, so long as the
court's consideration of the quantum of evidence issue stops when
it has determined that there is not a total lack of evidence on
behalf of the prosecution. And such a limited examination of the
record would seem fully consonant with the principle, recognized
by the Supren1e Court, that in its review of a conviction of crime,
regard for the requirements of due process inescapably imposes
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upon it an exercise of judgment upon the 'whole course of the proceedings' in order to ascertain whether they offend those canons
of decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of
English-speaking people even toward those charged with the most
heinous offenses."

The present case is not a situation where there is not any
evidence of the accused's guilt. Quite to the contrary, the
only evidence received by the court is evidence of the accused's guilt, and although admittedly it is a short record
in the instant case, the evidence clearly provides a basis for
the trial court's decision, and the appellant cannot be said
to have been denied due process of law.
POINT III.
41-1-127, U.C.A. 1953, PROVIDING FOR THE REGISTRATION OF CERTAIN MOTOR VEHICLES, IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL, AND THE APPELLANT'S FAILURE TO
COMPLY WITH THE REGISTRATION PROVISIONS OF
THAT STATUTE WARRANTED HIS CONVICTION UNDER
THE PROVISIONS OF 41-1-128, U.C.A. 1953.

41-1-127, U.C.A. 1953, establishes the registration requirements for motor vehicles operating on the highways
of the State of Utah. 41-1-127 (f) establishes registration
fees and requirements of registration based on gross laden
weight. 41-1-127, U.C.A. 1953, as it is presently written,
was enacted by Laws of Utah 1963, Chapter 67, Section 1,
and therefore was not in effect at the time the accused was
charged and at the time the offense with which he was
charged was committed. The provisions of 41-1-127(£),
which were in effect at the time the instant offense was committed, read as follows in its material part:
"A registration fee on all motor vehicles designed, used, or
maintained for the transportation of passengers for hire or for the
transportation of property, based on gross laden weight as set forth
in the licensee's application for registration, unless exempt under
section 41-1-19, or unless complying with the provisions of section 41-1-88.
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"\\'h('rt' motor vehicles, except passenger cars, are operated in

con1bination with semitrailers or trailers (including house trailers),
each such n1otor vehicle shall be required to register for the total
gross laden weight of all units of said combination. ~set of ide~
tification plates shall be issued for each motor vehicle so regtstered."

Section 41-1-128, U.C.A. 1953, makes it illegal to operate a vehicle in violation of the provisions of 41-1-127,
LJ.C.A. 1953. The appellant has contended that 41-1-127
as it existed at the time of the instant offense was unconstitutional. Appellant's contention is that the law is discriminatory and arbitrary and, therefore, is in violation of
Article I, Section 24, of the Utah Constitution providing
for uniform legislation, and the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution providing for the equal protection of the laws. Appellant's major argument is that, to
the extent that passenger cars when operated in combination with trailers are excluded from the provisions of 41-1127(f), U.C.A. 1953, and pickup trucks, which the appellant "·as operating, are not, the statute is arbitrary and
capricious and there is no justification for the distinction.
The general rule relating to the powers of the Legislature
to enact regulatory laws and revenue producing laws based
upon the operation of vehicles on State highways is set forth
in 60 C.J .S., Motor Vehicles, Sec. 138:
".-\ provision for license fees for motor vehicles must not discriminate in respect of amount against certain classes without reason and without relation to the general purpose of the motor
vehicle la,,·s; but the mere fact that the amount of the license fee
or ta..x imposed on one class of motor vehicle owners or operators
is different from that imposed on another class does not render a
regulation invalid \vhere the classification is a reasonable one and
all owners or operators within each class are treated alike, even
though the classification may cause a disproportionate payment of
taxes by isolated individuals in such classes.
"Regulations haYe been held valid as not being unreasonable,
discriminatory, or violative of constitutional provisions which base
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or grade the amount of the license fee or tax according to the type,
size, weight, according to the capacity or load, or according to the
seating capacity of the particular vehicle, or, in the case of jitneys
and like vehicles, according to the amount charged for transportation.***"

This court has recognized the validity of provisions
regulating the operation of motor vehicles on the highway
and requiring special registration permits based upon the
weight or other nature of the vehicle being operated. In
Carter v. State Tax Commission, 98 Utah 96, 96 P.2d 727
(1939), this court considered the provisions of 41-1-127,
U.C.A. 1953, as then written. The court upheld the constitutionality of the breakdown based upon gross weight,
although the court did strike down a provision relating to
assessment based upon the fuel used as not being germane
to the title of the legislation. In affirming the constitutionality of the Act so far as it based registration and regulation on theory of weight or vehicle use, the court stated:
"* * * The Legislature determines the lines of separation between
classes. That is their prerogative, and the courts have no right' to
interfere on any theory that those lines were improperly placedthat the weights selected for a division into classes were not properly selected. Presumably the Legislature had the necessary information before it to justify such segregation into classes. It is
obvious that the ground of difference between classes has a fair
and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, that is, to
regulation based upon the wear and tear to which the roads are
subjected by the licensee. The cases are many upholding such a
classification. People v. Deep Rock Oil Corporation, 343 Ill 388,
175 NE 572 ~ Morf v. Bingaman, 298 LrS 407, 56 S Ct 756,80 Led
1245; Ogilvie v. Hailey, 141 Tenn 392,210 SW 645; Raymon~ v.
Holn1, 165 Minn 215, 206 NW 166; McReavy v. Holm, 166 Mmn
22, 206 NW 942; Wilson v. State, 143 Tenn 55, 224 SW 168; Ard
v. People, 66 Colo 480, 182 P 892; Kane v. Tilas, 81 NJL 594,
80 A 453, LRA1917B 553, Ann Cas 1912D 237; and Camas Stage
Co. v. Kozer, 104 Or 600,209 P 95,25 ALR 27.
"Now paragraphs (a) and (b) of section 133, are a continuation of the same principle. Presumably the Legislature had before
it facts justifying the conclusion that vehicles of a weight of 13,000
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pounds and more, and of 20,000 pounds and more, are exceptionally injurious to the highways, and therefore they should pay
an additional license fee to compensate for that extra injury. We
as ;t court cannot gainsay that. Even though we might believe it a
'pilin~ on' of fees, the right ~o exercise its j~dgment lies with the
Legislature. To hold otherwise would depnve that branch of our
government of its independence."

This court, therefore, recognized that the Legislature
has substantial prerogatives in determining the classifications for regulatory legislation and that such legislation
enjoys every presumption of constitutionality. Thomas v.
Daughters of Utah Pioneers, 114 Utah 108, 197 P.2d 477
( 1948); Gubler v. Utah State Teachers' Retirement Board,
113 Utah 188, 192 P.2d 580 ( 1948); Salt Lake City v. Tax
Commission, 11 Utah 2d 359, 359 P.2d 397 ( 1961). More
recently in Wycoff Company v. Public Service Commission,
389 P.2d 57 (Utah 1964), this court had occasion to consider an attack against the constitutionality of the Utah
~[otor Carrier Act. In that case it was alleged that the
Utah l\Iotor Carrier Act was unconstitutional because it
exempted from coverage certain classes of vehicles, such
as school vehicles, mail trucks, agricultural vehicles, newspaper trucks, towing and wrecking trucks, etc. In that case
the court stated in sustaining the constitutionality:
. "We have given careful consideration to classes of transportation exempted under 54-6-12 and conclude that in each instance
the classification is reasonable. For the most part, the transportation exempted is casual, seasonal, slow-moving, not on regular
routes or schedules, frequently in special equipment, and for comparatively short distances. Each of the exemptions have been held
reasonable by other courts."

.\sa consequence, it appears that unless the action of the
Legislature in carving out a particular exception in the coverage of a statute has acted without any reasonable basis
so that there is in fact no difference between the exempted
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group and the non-exempted group, the legislation will
be sustained. In State v. Mason, 94 Utah 501, 78 P.2d
920, this court upheld a statute requiring that a license
be obtained for commercial activities where the statute
exempted commercial merchants dealing with agricultural
products. The court held that the exemption was a reasonable action for the Legislature to take. See also Garrett
Freightlines v. State Tax Commission, 103 Utah 390, 135
P.2d523, which upheld the Use Fuel Tax Act of 1941. The
Supreme Court will not concern itself with the wisdom or
policy of the law so long as there appears to be some reasonable basis for the Legislature's classification. Hansen v.
Public Employees' Retirement System, 122 Utah 44, 246
P.2d 591.
Clearly, there is an apparent justification for the Legislatures' exclusion of passenger vehicles when used in combination with a trailer, while at the same time encompassing a pickup truck or truck when used in combination with
a trailer. First, it is obvious that the weight of a passenger
vehicle will usually not be as great as the weight of a pickup
truck or other such vehicle, and as a consequence, there will
be less wear on the public roads. Secondly, passenger vehicles are limited in their power output and are usually not
capable of hauling large trailers, which means that where a
passenger vehicle is used in combination with a trailer, the
trailer would most probably be a small unit used casually
for camping trips or recreation purposes. Third, the distance for which an automobile may be used to haul a trailer
is substantially less than for a truck, because of the difference in the power of both vehicles. Consequently, extensive
use of the public roads is less likely where a passenger vehicle rather than a truck is hauling a trailer. Fourth, most
families have passenger vehicles, and \vhen hauling a pas-
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srngcr vehicle and a trailer, it is usually for sporadic use for
family purposes, whereas where an individual owns a truck
or pickup truck \vhich is capable of hauling a large unit, it is
most probable that the truck-trailer combination will be
used more extensively and will not be the sporadic family
type of use associated with passenger vehicle-trailer units.
As noted in 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles, Sec. 138, supra, if
there is a general purpose behind the Legislature's classification, the mere fact that in a particular instance there is
a disproportionate amount of inconvenience to particular
individuals fitting \vithin the class will not justify a determination that the legislation is unconstitutional. See also
Prouty v. Coyne, 55 F.2d 289 (D.C.S.D.).
Appellant's argument that the subsequent amendment
to i-1-1-127 (f), U.C.A. 1953, by the Legislature in 1963
indicates the Legislature felt the previous enactment to be
unconstitutional is without merit. The previous provision
had been on the books some four years, and there is nothing
in the legislative journals nor the title of the amendatory
bill (see La\\·s of Utah 1963, Chapter 67, Sec. 1), which
\rould lead to the conclusion that the Legislature felt its
previous enactment to be unconstitutional. The Legislature
may, for the purposes of legislative policy, effect changes in
statutes from time to time as the reasonable discretion of
the Legislature dictates, \Vithout it being inferred that any
previous action of the Legislature was contrary to constitutional principles. As noted above, there are substantial reasons supporting the classification that the Legislature had
previously established. By the same token, the Legislature
may feel that there are other justifications which warrant
some different classification. However, neither situation
necessarily implies arbitrary action on the part of the Legislature. Consequently. it is clear that the appellant's chal-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

18
lenge to the constitutionality of 41-1-127 (f), U.C.A. 1953,
as it existed at the time of the offense charged, is without
merit.

CONCLUSION
The appellant has had two full trials on the issue of his
guilt or innocence of the crime charged and has had full
exploration of his recourse in the trial courts. A thorough
analysis of his claims for relief before this court demonstrates that there is no merit to the appellant's appeal. Consequently, this court should affirm the conviction.
Respectfully submitted,

A. PRATT KESLER
Attorney General
RONALD N. BOYCE
Chief Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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